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RECONSTRUCTING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A REPLY TO
AMAR AND MARCUS'S TRIPLE PLAY ON
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Susan N. Herman*
Call me absolutist. To me, Stacey Koon,' Lemrick Nelson, 2 and Paul
Hill look alike. Each of these men was twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense, something the Double Jeopardy Clause 4 plainly prohibits.
The Supreme Court agrees that these cases are alike. The Court's dual
sovereignty doctrine, which holds that prosecutions by two different "sovereigns"-either state or federal governments-can never be for the
"same offense," would permit reprosecution in all three cases. 5
Akhil Amar and Jonathan Marcus, rethinking double jeopardy "in
the wake of the Rodney King affair" 6 seek to mediate between the
Supreme Court's fiction-based approach and my Hugo Black-like insis3

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. BA Barnard College, 1968;J.D. New York
University School of Law, 1974. I am grateful to Abigail Young, second-year student at
Columbia Law School, for her invaluable research assistance, to Erwin Chemerinsky, Will
Hellerstein, Bill Reynolds, and David Rudovsky for their comments, and to Brooklyn Law
School for the continuing generosity of its research stipend program.
1. Stacey Koon, a Los Angeles police sergeant, was, as we all still vividly recall,
acquitted by ajury in state court on a charge of using excessive force during the arrest of
Rodney King, and then charged in federal court with willfully violating Rodney King's
constitutional right to be free from the use of unreasonable force during arrest and to be
free from harm while in custody. Koon was actually convicted of failure to prevent
Laurence Powell's unlawful assault on King, see United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769,
774 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (Sentencing Memorandum), aff'd in part, vacated in part and
remanded for resentencing, 34 F.Sd 1416 (9th Cir. 1994), and was sentenced (like Powell)
to thirty months imprisonment, see id. at 792.
2. Lemrick Nelson was acquitted by a state court jury of murdering Yankel
Rosenbaum. See Stephen Labaton, Reno to Take Over Inquiry in Slaying in Crown
Heights, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1994, at Al. He is now the subject of a pending federal
prosecution for violating Rosenbaum's civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) (2) (B) by
killing him. See United States v. Nelson, Cr. No. 94-823 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (Juvenile
Information).
3. In a reversal of the typical order of dual prosecutions, Paul Hill was convicted by a
federal court jury of violating the new Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances [FACE]
statute, 18 U.S.CA § 248 (West 1994), by killing Dr. John Britton, a doctor at the
Pensacola Ladies Center, and his escort. See Ronald Smothers, Abortion Protester Is Guilty
Under Clinic Access Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1994, at A18. He was then convicted by a
state court jury of murdering Dr. Britton, see Jury Favors Execution of Abortion Foe, LA
Times, Nov. 4, 1994, at A24, and subsequently sentenced in federal court to two
concurrent terms of life imprisonment, see Hill Gets 2 Life Terms for Clinic Slayings, LA
Times, Dec. 3, 1994, at A31.
4. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." U.S. Const. amend. V.
5. For a recent exposition of the Court's theory, see Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82
(1985).
6. Akhil Reed Amar &Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
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tence on analyzing criminal procedure from the perspective of the defendant. First, like the vast majority of legal academicians who have7
rethought the dual sovereignty doctrine, they would abrogate it,
although with one novel exception. They would allow reprosecution, at
least by the federal government, of civil rights defendants who, like Koon
but not Nelson or Hill, are state officials. 8 Second, Amar and Marcus
rethink the entire definition of "same offense" in a way that provides a
second, not unrelated, basis for allowing reprosecution of Koon, Nelson,
or Hill.9 Finally, they consider whether reprosecution of Stacey Koon
should be permitted for yet a third reason-that Koon should bear responsibility for moving for a change of venue that, when granted, yielded
a jury that reached an unreliable verdict because the jury itself was
unrepresentative. 10
I am particularly troubled by the two proposed exceptions to the finality of jury verdicts, especially verdicts of acquittal: the state official
exception in our hypothetical dual-sovereignty-less world, and the notion
that defendants might forfeit double jeopardy protection by participating
in the selection of venue or jurors. I do understand why Amar and
Marcus are anxious to permit a retrial of Stacey Koon. I have already
expressed my own concern about the reliability of jury verdicts in cases
1
involving the interests of minorities, whether as defendants or victims.'
Both of these problematic exceptions attempt to serve the goals of the
Reconstruction Era by allowing second prosecutions in those cases where
the state criminal process might seem untrustworthy. Amar and Marcus
find in the Fourteenth Amendment a convenient path around the
Double Jeopardy Clause in two categories of cases; at every turn of the
maze, I keep finding the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In this essay, I will discuss why I think Amar and Marcus are wrong in
characterizing their dual sovereignty exception as a natural byproduct of2
the refined incorporation process previously expounded by Amar.1
Neither the federal interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Fourteenth Amendment's recalibration of the workings of federalism require even the limited dual sovereignty exception proposed. In
7. See id. at 4-15. I am already on record as one of those commentators who agrees.
See Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King,
and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 609, 625 (1994). For a substantial list of other
commentators who have critiqued or wholly rejected the dual sovereignty doctrine, see id.
at 618-19 n.32.
8. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 16-26.
9. See id. at 27-48 (on defining "same offense" generally). Their definition of "same
offense" would permit reprosecution of Koon, see id. at 44-46, as well as of the
overlapping but not identical state and federal offenses in the Nelson and Hill cases, see
supra notes 2-3.
10. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 48-58.
11. See Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: RepresentationReinforcement, Colorblindness, and theJury, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1807, 1842-46 (1993).
12. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and The Fourteenth Amendment, 101
Yale LJ. 1193 (1992).
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addition, I will comment on their suggestion that we might attack the
problem of unrepresentative juries by scapegoating defendants who take
advantage of the adversary process by participating in the selection of
juries or venue. Both of these proposals would sacrifice an essential component of fair criminal procedure in hopes of buying a quick fix to
problems we have inherited from the Reconstruction Era. Both also reflect an unwillingness to accept the flaws of the jury system along with its
benefits.
I. REFINING DuAL SOVEREIGNTY

A. The Casefor a Refined Dual Sovereignty Exception
Amar, Marcus, and I all agree that the dual sovereignty doctrine
should be abolished, and we even seem to agree on the reasons. First, the
purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prohibit the government
from repeatedly prosecuting an individual "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty."' 5 As Justice Black
observed when adoption of the dual sovereignty doctrine was still a close
question for the Supreme Court, a criminal defendant who is being
reprosecuted for the same offense suffers the same harms regardless of
how many governments are behind the multiple prosecutions. 14 The
Court's acceptance of the dual sovereignty doctrine rests heavily on an
analysis preoccupied with the imperatives of federalism, 15 and blind to
16 Amar and Marcus firmly reintroduce
the perspective of the defendant.
17
the defendant's point of view.
Amar and Marcus also reintroduce the point of view of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court itself has recognized the
advent of a post-incorporation "new age of cooperative federalism" in
13. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Anotherjustification is that
the double jeopardy ban invigorates the right to trial by jury by protecting the jury's
nullification power. See Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of
Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 122-32.
14. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
15. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88-91 (1985) (describing federalism as a
regime in which distinct sovereigns have distinct interests which can best be served by
permitting them to pursue separate prosecutions).
16. The Heath majority, for example, rejected petitioner's argument that his double
jeopardy interests should at least be weighed against the needs of two different states to try
him for precisely the same homicide. The Court declared that, under the dual sovereignty
doctrine, the two offenses were definitionally not the "same" within the meaning of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Therefore, the defendant's interests were irrelevant and any
balancing by the Court was inappropriate. See id. at 92.
17. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 5-6, 9-10, 21 (emphasizing defendant's
perspective and criticizing Supreme Court's one-sided views).
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cases applying other Bill of Rights guarantees across jurisdictional lines.' 8
In interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause, however, the Court woodenly adheres to an outmoded dual sovereignty model. Amar and Marcus
urge consistency. In addition, the doctrine is at odds with any reasonable
Constitution's view of sovereignty,' 9 and with preinterpretation of the 20
history.
constitutional
However, Amar and Marcus also find that the dual sovereignty doctrine "still has a narrow but crucial role to play in enforcing the
Reconstruction values of [the Fourteenth] Amendment against state officials." 2 ' Amar's earlier work projects an appealing vision of neo-federalism that provides an incentive to read the Fourteenth Amendment as permitting multiple prosecutions of state officials who have violated
individuals' federal civil rights. The state and federal governments, in
this reading of the Constitution, stand in tandem to check and balance
one another and to engage in a dialogue in order to provide expansive
protection for the rights of We the People.2 2 If a state is, or might be an
inadequate guardian of federally protected rights, the federal government can intervene.23 Amar and Marcus's treatment of the dual sover18. See id. at 12-15. Anar and Marcus discuss Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960) (rejecting Fourth Amendment silver platter doctrine) and Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (holding that state witness cannot be compelled to provide
evidence that could be used against him in federal prosecution).
In Murphy, the Court considered the argument that a dual sovereignty approach to
the privilege against self-incrimination was warranted because the privilege acts as a
limitation on government rather than as a protection of individual dignity. See 8John H.
Wigrnore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2258 (John T. McNaughton rev., 1961).
The Court rejected this characterization, declaring the privilege to be an individual right.
See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55-56 & n.5; Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 13-15.
19. Recent commentators have stressed that the dual sovereignty doctrine flagrantly
misrepresents the Constitution's theory of who our "sovereign" is. See Daniel A. Braun,
Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive Prosecutions in the Age of
Cooperative Federalism, 20 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 30 (1992); Michael A. Dawson, Note,
Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 Yale L.J.
281 (1992). Under our Constitution, there is only one sovereign: "We the People." See
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425, 1429-66 (1987)
(reading Constitution as espousing unitary theory of sovereignty.)
20. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 6; Herman, supra note 7, at 625 n.61. For a
fuller originalist account of why the Double Jeopardy Clause should not be read as
authorizing successive prosecutions by dual sovereigns, mostly based on cases from
England (source of the Double Jeopardy Clause), see Paul G. Cassell, The Rodney King
Trials and the DoubleJeopardy Clause: Some Observations on Original Meaning and the
ACLU's Schizophrenic Views of the Dual Sovereign Doctrine, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 693,
709-19 (1994), and sources cited therein. Amar and Marcus do note that the doctrine
might more appropriately be applied to federal/state dual prosecutions than to state/state
prosecutions. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 7 n.42.
21. Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 19.
22. See Amar, supra note 19, at 1449-50.
23. In Amar's account, the states would also be empowered to protect the people
against the overreaching of federal officials in more instances than current Supreme Court
law would allow. See id. at 1509-10. Amar's vision of reciprocity need not go so far as to
permit states to reprosecute federal officials who have escaped liability for violation of
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eignty problem rests on this foundation. The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment wished to invoke the power of the federal government
against state officials where necessary; they also wanted to allow the states
to punish their own miscreants where possible. Interpreting the Double
Jeopardy Clause to preclude federal prosecution of those state officials
who have been prosecuted by the states themselves-and perhaps given
sweetheart deals, whether purposely or not 2 4-could thwart the federal
government's efforts at criminal prosecution. Thus, Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, whose paradigm case is said to have been criminal prosecution of state officials, 2 5 scrapes against the Double Jeopardy
Clause and allows adherence to the dual sovereignty model in this one
instance where the federal and state interests are inherently adverse.
This is a sensible policy argument, but it is not a revelation of constitutional structure. Permission to reprosecute in such cases is not a fair
inference from the Fourteenth Amendment, but a choice among models
of how the federal and state governments might interact in promoting
federal civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In making their
choice, Amar and Marcus open themselves to precisely the criticisms they
have leveled at the Court: They turn away from the defendant's point 26of
view and do so under the yoke of a selective definition of federalism.
federal civil rights, since Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment confers its special
implementation powers only on Congress.
24. Amar and Marcus do not limit their proposed exception to cases where there has
actually been collusion or a sham prosecution, perhaps in part because they are also
interested in preventing what they may regard as unconscious collaboration among state
actors. For example, they criticize the judge in the first Rodney King trial who granted
defendants' motion for change of venue, regarding his ruling as a questionable advantage
conferred on his fellow state employees; they do not accuse him of bad faith. See Amar &
Marcus, supra note 6, at 23 & n.123. Another reason for not limiting the exception is that
collusion is difficult to prove. See infra note 40.
25. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 117-118 & n.105. Because "paradigmatic" is
not the same as "only," see id. at 26 n.140, Amar and Marcus need not commit themselves
here to a position on the much mooted question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment
should be read to cover private action as well. Compare, e.g., Michael P. Zuckert,
Congressional Power Under the Fourteenth Amendment-The Original Understanding of
Section Five, 3 Const. Commentary 123, 141-44 (1986) (arguing that private action was
intended to be covered) with Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution, and Congress
1863-1869, at 75-78 (1990) (arguing that scope was intended to be limited to state action)
and Harold M. Hyman & William M. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law: Constitutional
Development 1835-1875, at 387 (1982) (suggesting that the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its surrounding debates is simply too messy to permit drawing any
answer). Nevertheless, Amar and Marcus recapitulate the state/private action dichotomy
with their state official exception, leaving the problem of private violations of rights to the
alternative sanctions I describe later in this section. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at
18 & n.105, 26 & n.140.
26. They even adopt the same technique the Supreme Court has used to embed its
dual sovereignty doctrine in the Fifth Amendment: defining reprosecution of state
officials as categorically not the "same offense." See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at
19-20.

19
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I am sympathetic to Amar's idea of refined incorporation-if the
Fourteenth Amendment is the conduit by which provisions of the Bill of
Rights are to be applied to the states, any relevant messages embedded in
the Fourteenth Amendment itself should be heeded, even if they appear
to contradict the original Bill of Rights. But this particular application
leads me to believe that the theory itself is not yet sufficiently refined.
Although I know that Amar and Marcus would resist the characterization,
at bottom they are simply bartering the "narrow doublejeopardy rights" 27
of a few individuals for what they hope will be the seeds of equality.
B. Two Models of Federalism
1. A Cooperative Choice of Forum Model. - To demonstrate that Amar
and Marcus's state official exception is a choice rather than an inference,
I offer an alternative program for serving the federal and federalism goals
of the Fourteenth Amendment: a cooperative choice of forum model.
Consider the problem in the Rodney King case itself: police brutality.
Without resorting to reprosecution, Congress could use its power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact legislation creating
an integrated federal program for uncovering and redressing police misconduct. First, potent removal provisions could allow federal prosecutors

to remove or supersede state criminal prosecutions of state law enforcement officials who have abused their positions, particularly if the abuse
involved minorities. 28 While the relitigation model serves federalism interests by allowing the states to prosecute first in every case, the choice of
forum model would serve federalism interests in a different way-by respecting the finality of state court decisions in those cases where states
were allowed to prosecute. 29 If state employees are truly in a unique and
27. "The narrow doublejeopardy rights of a handful of officials would undermine the
Fourteenth Amendment's global scheme of protecting ordinary citizens against a wide
range of state abuse." Id. at 18.
28. The removal statute actually enacted by Congress in 1866 was construed quite
narrowly. See infra note 49.
Congress has given broad federal removal powers to state actor defendants in federal
civil rights actions commenced in state court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988), and to
federal official defendants in state civil or criminal proceedings, see 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1)
(1988). In both of these contexts, defendants are guaranteed the right to a federal forum,
in order to avoid local prejudices or to promote uniform interpretation of federal
defenses. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of allowing
federal officials to remove the trial of state criminal offenses. See, e.g., Willingham v.
Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405-06 (1969); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263-65 (1879).
29. Each of these models has been adopted in other areas involving alleged federal
civil rights violations by state actors. In the habeas corpus statutes, Congress has endorsed
relitigation as a suitable form ofjurisdictional redundancy. If an individual in state custody
wishes to complain that he is in custody in violation of the federal Constitution, he must
first present his claim to the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988). As a result, state
and federal courts achieve the relationship Amar and Marcus wish to establish with respect
to criminal prosecution of state official rights violators: The state courts have the first
chance to remedy the constitutional missteps of their employees, while the federal courts
hover in the background to provide an incentive for the state courts to render reasonable
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conflict-ridden position, as Amar and Marcus maintain, it would not be
an insult to allow the federal government the option of prosecuting these
30
defendants initially.
The federal interest in promoting equality might well be better
served by this model. The dual sovereignty doctrine has made such removal statutes seem unnecessary because the federal government has
been allowed to make decisions after, rather than before or during, state
prosecutions. This sequential approach to federal jurisdiction has. led
both Congress and prosecutors to regard the federal role as peripheral.
Prosecutions are few; 3 ' punishments often seem incongruously light.

The celebrated case of Screws v. United States,3 2 for example, involved the
federal civil rights prosecution of a sheriff implicated in the fatal beating
of a black man against whom he bore a grudge.3 3 An admiring account
of the case would stress that the Supreme Court labored mightily to uphold a federal conviction of an abusive state official who otherwise might
not have been punished at all. But the maximum statutory penalty under
the federal statute, as originally written and at the time of Screws, was one
year and $1000.3 4 To the extent that the federal courts are empowered
decisions, or, if necessary, to overrule unreasonable decisions. See Robert M. Cover & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale LJ.
1035, 1045-54 (1977) (describing how the dialogue between state and federal courts
created by the structure of habeas corpus review serves the Warren Court's values of
equality).
Habeas corpus, however, is not the only current model of federalist dialogue about
state actors who violate federal rights. Civil rights plaintiffs who wish to bring civil actions
against state officials who have allegedly violated their federal constitutional rights are
offered a choice of a state or federal court forum. See Stephen Steinglass, Section 1983
Litigation in the State Courts (1988); Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and
the State Courts, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 1057, 1059 (1989). Federal courts are treated as
privileged arbiters of federal constitutional claims in that defendants may remove to
federal court. See supra note 28. But once the choice of forum has been finalized, the
plaintiff is subject to collateral estoppel rules, see Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 85 (1984), even if the plaintiff did not voluntarily choose a state court
forum, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-05 (1980) (holding Fourth Amendment
claim in federal court estopped by litigation of motion to suppress in state criminal
proceeding). Each model promotes Arobust federalist dialogue in its own way. Cf. Robert
M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 639, 646-48 (1981) (describing models of strategic choice of forum
and of sequential redundancy as both serving functions ofjurisdictional redundancy).
30. The Department ofJustice could still decide, on a case by case basis, to allow the
states to prosecute any case if that seemed a better strategy in that particular context.
31. During 1991, the year of Rodney King's beating, the Department of Justice
prosecuted only 64 cases of police misconduct throughout the nation. See Amy Stevens,
Split Decision: Verdict in King Case Owes Much to Lessons of State-Court Trial, Wall St.J.,
Apr. 19, 1993, at Al, A4.
32. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
33. See id. at 92-93.
34. See id. at 93. The dissent complained that the federal prosecution, for a civil
rights violation rather than for homicide, might have deflected state prosecution for the
crime of murder. See id. at 138 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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to try the actual conduct constituting the relevant state offense 3 5-assault
in the Rodney King case, homicide in the Lemrick Nelson case-and to
provide an appropriate punishment, we can avoid anomalies like the
Screws case. Full federal attention is less likely in a sequential model.
Second, statutes, or perhaps even administrative regulations, could
authorize federal investigators and prosecutors to cooperate in state criminal investigations and prosecutions.3 6 The dual sovereignty doctrine actively discourages cooperation. Under current law, the federal government loses its power to reprosecute only if it cooperates in the first
prosecution, so that the two prosecutions can no longer truly be deemed
"dual."3 7 Encouraging collaboration while providing a federal option to
remove in appropriate circumstances would promote a more cooperative
38
federalism than retaining a shred of the dual sovereignty doctrine.
Amar and Marcus are reluctant to cede finality to state court prosecutions where defendants' official status might lead to collusion, or to the
immunizing shelter of half-hearted prosecutions or pardons. Congress
could address this concern directly with a statute criminalizing the use of
judicial process or even the pardon power to obstruct federal civil rights
prosecutions. 39 Such a statute would provide a disincentive to the prosecutors,judges, or governors who thwart federal interests, rather than punishing defendants with reprosecution, regardless of whether they have
35. Donald Zeigler intriguingly suggests the creation of pendent or ancillary criminal
jurisdiction, a counterpart to pendent jurisdiction in civil cases, to allow overlapping or
related state and federal crimes arising out of the same conduct to be tried together in one
forum. See Donald H. Zeigler, Twins Separated at Birth: A Comparative History of the
Civil and Criminal Arising Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and Some Proposals
for Change, 19 Vt. L. Rev. 673, 765-80 (1995).
36. For a description of advantages enjoyed by federal investigators and prosecutors,
many of which could be transferred to a state forum, see Laurie L. Levenson, The Future
of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41
UCLA L. Rev. 509, 542 (1994); see also Braun, supra note 19, at 68-69 & nn.344-45
(giving examples of federal-state cooperation in various areas of law enforcement,
including drug crime).
37. The notion of dual sovereigns prosecuting their own cases is then said to be a
"sham." See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1959).
38. The Court's dual sovereignty doctrine, like Amar and Marcus's narrower
exception, fails to take adequate account of the increasingly overlapping state and federal
efforts at defining and controlling crime. See Braun, supra note 19, at 7-10, 67-72; cf.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1964) (describing emerging "united
front" in state and federal law enforcement efforts). Promoting cooperation is not only
likely to produce better results, it also reflects reality better than the idea of distinct federal
and state spheres of authority.
39. Cf. 18 U.S.CA §§ 1501-13 (West Supp. 1995) (criminalizing obstruction of
justice in general). In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), the Court upheld the
conviction of a state court judge for violating the Act of March 1, 1875 § 4, 18 Stat. § 336,
by excluding or failing to summon grand and petit jurors on the basis of race. The Court
found the Act to be authorized by Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, ruling that
such federal enforcement statutes may properly be directed against state executive,
legislative, or judicial officers. See id.at 344-46.
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colluded with the obstructionist state officials. 4 0 Finally, statutes could
authorize the Department of Justice to seek civil remedies, particularly
injunctive relief, against individual law enforcement officials, their super41
visors, or even police departments.
Both of these models-the relitigation model favored by Amar and
Marcus as to state officials, and the cooperative choice of forum model I
propose-serve the Fourteenth Amendment's goals of equality and cooperative federalism; neither was selected by the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment or by Congress, 42 either before or after the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. How should we choose between them? If I
were making an unfettered policy choice, I might have some difficulty
deciding which model would be more effective. Each has advantages and
disadvantages. For me, however, the Double Jeopardy Clause makes the
choice easy. Amar and Marcus can reach their choice only because they
omit any consideration of the values underlying the Double Jeopardy
Clause and then make some unexamined assumptions that lead them to
prefer relitigation. It is the purpose of the next section to examine those
assumptions and to bring double jeopardy values back into the picture.
2. Choosing a Model
a. The Problem of Self-Dealing. - In defending their choice of model,

Amar and Marcus declare that allowing the states the opportunity to immunize their own officials "would" undermine the goals of Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, whose paradigm case they define as federal
40. Amar and Marcus are appropriately concerned that the factual predicate for such
a charge would be difficult to establish, see Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 24 & n.128,
but this concern does not warrant taking a categorical approach. The blunt 1Itapon of
permission to reprosecute is directed at all defendants, even if they are innocent of any
collusion, and not at the state officials who have actually obstructed the federal interest.
41. Some have argued that a federal program of civil litigation could be more
effective in controlling police misconduct than criminal prosecution. SeeJon 0. Newman,
Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for
Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 Yale LJ.447, 449-55 (1978); see also Paul Hoffman, The
Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police
Abuse in Urban America, 66 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1453 (1993).
Criminal prosecution focuses only on particular abuses of power after they have
occurred. Civil litigation by private individuals is also limited by its focus on the individual
plaintiff, even in a class action. Under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), for
example, individual plaintiffs are denied standing to seek injunctive relief against
questionable police practices unless they can meet the onerous burden of showing that
they personally are likely to be subjected to that practice again. See id. at 102. Although
the Los Angeles police had allegedly subjected Lyons to a dangerous chokehold
authorized by departmental policy, Lyons could not meet the Court's prerequisite to
injunctive relief because he could not show that he personally was likely to be arrested and
subjected to a chokehold again. See id. at 105. The Department ofJustice could easily be
given statutory authority to seek injunctive relief to protect the class of people who might
be subjected to chokeholds.
42. Congress has made this choice in other areas, such as in the habeas corpus
context described supra note 29.
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criminal prosecution of state officials. 43 Why do they assume that this is
true? There is no history to suggest that such self-dealing has ever been a
real problem. In the voluminous history of the Reconstruction Era, it is
difficult to find any evidence of prosecutors abusing state process in this
manner on behalf of state employees or private actors. The predominant
problem of the Reconstruction Era was that state prosecutors simply
failed or refused to prosecute at all. 4 4 It is possible that state prosecutors
could have learned to offer sweetheart plea bargains to state officials, just
as state court judges might have meted out indulgent sentences after conviction, and governors might have become overly generous with their pardon power. The usual political checks on abuse of the power to prosecute or pardon might be ineffective if the defendants' acts were popular.
But if there is widespread local support for defendants, there is no need
for prosecutors, judges, or governors to take a visible dive and risk political consequences. If defendants are as popular as the Klan was in some
localities during Reconstruction, juries are unlikely to convict. The greatest obstacle to using the criminal justice system to protect civil rights during Reconstruction was that there was not yet a sufficient consensus in the
southern states that the purportedly criminal actions should be punished.45 Juries often did refuse to convict. 4 6 For the same reason, even
when prosecutions were successful, convictions not infrequently resulted
in light sentences and pardons. 47 The true advantages of federal prose-

43. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 18.

44. See, e.g., Hyman &Wiecek, supra note 25, at 425 (discussing nonenforcement of
criminal law where whites perpetrated offenses against blacks); Donald G. Nieman, To Set
the Law in Motion: The Freedman's Bureau and the Legal Rights of Blacks: 1865-1868, at

132-34

(1979) (describing reluctance of justices of the peace to issue warrants against

whites charged with assaulting freedmen); Howard N. Rabinowitz, The Conflict Between
Blacks and the Police in the Urban South, 1865-1900, in Black Southerners and the Law
1865-1900, at 291 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994).
45. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The
Federal Courts, Department ofJustice and Civil Rights, 1866-1876, at 28 (1985) ("Local
peace officers usually failed to bring terrorists to justice, either because of fear for their

personal safety or because of their support for the terrorists."); Nieman, supra note 44, at
125-28, 134 (describing failure of law enforcement officials to prosecute white
perpetrators as unsurprising result of public approval of anti-black violence); see also
Rabinowitz, supra note 44, at 291-92 (noting that even victims believed that lack of public
sympathy made it futile to bring charges).
46. See, e.g., Nieman, supra note 44, at 129-30 (quoting one Freedman's Bureau
agent as saying, "The great enemy of the colored race is the trial by jury which should be
his greatest protection."); see also Michael K. Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 136, 158 (1986); Kaczorowski, supra note
45, at 28.
47. See, e.g., Nieman, supra note 44, at 130 (describing case in which one judge
sentenced to sixty days leader of group of white defendants convicted of beating and
torturing freedmen); Allen W. Trelease, White Terror- The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and
Southern Reconstruction 416-17 (1971) (recounting generous use of presidential as well
as gubernatorial pardons during Klan prosecutions in early 1870s).
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that
cution seem to have been, first, that it happened at all, and second,
48
federal prosecutors were willing and able to stack their juries.
Amar and Marcus do not rest their argument on empirical claims
about the problem of self-dealing, but on an inherent tension in the
state's role. However, even if we assume that self-dealing is a serious potential danger, without insisting on some past or present evidence of that
danger manifesting itself, allowing reprosecution of all state officials is an
overreaction. Although some officials might benefit from their positions,
others would not but would nonetheless be subjected to multiple
prosecution.
b. Defining the Goals of the FourteenthAmendment. - My next concern
is that the goals that "would" be undermined are too narrowly defined.
Amar and Marcus take Section Five to embody the relevant goals and,
because they describe that Section's paradigm case as being criminal
prosecution of state officials who violate civil rights, meaningful criminal
prosecutions of state officials who violate civil rights become definitionally necessary to serve that goal. But Section Five authorized criminal
prosecution in order to serve the Fourteenth Amendment's broader
goals, including the general goal of promoting equality. Amar and
Marcus, by treating criminal prosecution as the end rather than as the
means, put their own answer into the hat. I would not read Section Five
to establish criminal prosecution as the ultimate goal. If there are other
effective ways to serve the broader goal of reducing police misconductsuch as injunctive relief and the rest of the legislative program described
above-then the allegedly structural need for removing potential obstacles to successful criminal prosecution disappears.
c. Text, History, and Intent. - Neither the language of Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the acts of Congress implementing it
reveal whether the framers wished to adopt a relitigation model or a
choice of forum model. The Reconstruction Era Congress did use
Section Five to provide a basis for federal prosecution in instances where
the states were not prosecuting-at least with respect to state official defendants. The same Congress gave federal prosecutors some power to

48. Federal juries, drawn from a broader vicinage, avoided some of the problems of

local sympathies and fear of retaliation. See, e.g., Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and

Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33 Emory

LJ. 921, 937-39 (1984) (juries drawn from state-wide pool). The Klan Act caused white
jurors to default by providing that anyone who supported the Klan was excluded from jury
service, requiring an oath to that effect, and threatening with perjury charges anyone who
lied to get on a jury. See id.; see also Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction:
1863-1877, at 195 (1990); Kaczorowski, supra note 45, at 63 (federal prosecutors ensured
"impartial" juries by restricting juries in Klan prosecutions to Republicans-who, in the
Reconstruction South, were almost entirely black); Trelease, supra note 47, at 388 (effect
of the oath), 410 (noting that prosecutors had difficulties in Georgia, where jury selection
process favored appointment of Democrats, generally white, to juries).
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remove state prosecutions. 49 Congress did not, however, say anything to
prescribe the relationship between the state and federal governments in
cases where the states did prosecute and the prosecution was not
removed. 50
The history of the Fourteenth Amendment on this issue is characteristically unhelpful. The question of whether federal criminal prosecution
under Section Five should follow a relitigation or choice of forum model
does not seem to have come up during the debates.5 1 No one seems to
have discussed whether the double jeopardy ban posed an obstacle to
reprosecution. It is not even clear what the framers would have understood preexisting double jeopardy law to be. 52 Even if the framers be49. Section Fourteen of the Freedman's Bureau Act of 1866, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat.
173, 176-77, was interpreted to give federal officials power to remove cases in which state
officials enforced facially discriminatory laws against freedmen. See Kaczorowski, supra
note 45, at 38-39 (arguing that this removal power should have been read more broadly to
apply wherever there was a possibility of prejudice).
50. Amar and Marcus base their conclusion that state courts should always be allowed
the first opportunity to prosecute on the rationale that this model would "minimize
Section Five's disruption of traditional principles of federalism." Amar & Marcus, supra
note 6, at 23. This, as I have been arguing, is a choice and not an inference. They also cite
one tidbit of legislative history: John Bingham's comment on the desirability of allowing
primary enforcement to rest with the state. See id. at 23 & n.125. This is not enough basis
for an inference that the framers and ratifiers believed that the Fourteenth Amendment
endorsed this idea, particularly if the notion of primary enforcement must be understood
to include relitigation.
51. See id. at 25. With an unaccustomed disdain for intent, Amar and Marcus chide
me for my interest in whether the Reconstruction Era Congress intended to authorize
federal reprosecution rather than just federal prosecution. See id. For a nonoriginalist
like' *myself, the charge that I am overly dependent on historical soundbites is
disconcerting.
Amar and Marcus limit their own interpretation of the goals of the Fourteenth
Amendment to what they believe the framers intended, and then, in the absence of any
reliable indication of how the framers intended those goals to be implemented, assist by
drawing their own inferences from what they perceive to be the structure the framers built.
In this case, I do not believe that we can tell what was built without more information and,
therefore, I have continued to search fruitlessly for any indications that the framers might
have understood their structure to incorporate one model rather than the other. I do not
insist that we know the framers' specific ideas about double jeopardy; I merely believe that
knowing those views might provide some basis for reading into the Fourteenth
Amendment the model Amar and Marcus prefer.
52. Several Supreme Court cases decided before the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment endorsed a dual sovereignty concept, but only in dicta. In Fox v. Ohio, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847), the Court refused to overturn a conviction under an Ohio state
counterfeiting statute, rejecting an argument that the law was unconstitutional because it
created a possibility of dual punishment by state and federal government. See id. at 434.
The Court expressed doubt that any offender would be subjected to multiple punishment
for essentially the same act "unless indeed this might occur in instances of peculiar
enormity, or where the public safety demanded extraordinary rigor." Id. at 435. The
defendant was not prosecuted by the federal government. For other examples, see Moore
v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
560, 569-70 (1850). It was not until the Prohibition Era that the Supreme Court actually
interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause to permit the federal government to reprosecute
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lieved that, prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Double Jeopardy
Clause would have permitted some dual prosecutions, Amar and Marcus
agree that the Fourteenth Amendment created a new regime. By their
own account, the federal government should no longer have been permitted to reprosecute a defendant for an offense previously prosecuted in
state court, even if the federal interest were critical and even if the state
were inclined to thwart that federal interest. For example, imagine a
presidential assassin in a state hostile to the assassinated President or perhaps to the federal government generally. If that state were to immunize
the assassin from further prosecution by pardon or a sham proceeding,
Amar and Marcus, having rejected the dual sovereignty doctrine, could
not advocate federal reprosecution. 53 Amar and Marcus's reading of
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment privileges civil rights claims
above all other federal interests, whatever their constitutional origins,
after a state court prosecution. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). Even
after Lanza, the Court did not view the DoubleJeopardy Clause as implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty, see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), until 1969, see Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
Even if we take the mid-nineteenth century dicta seriously, we would have scant basis
for inferring the intent underlying the Fourteenth Amendment. Amar and Marcus are
noncommittal on the issue of whether the Supreme Court was wrong about dual
sovereignty all along, or only became wrong with the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 7 n.42. They treat history as allowing
either conclusion. See id. at 4 n.16, 7 n.42.
Their theory is easier to maintain if history is viewed as sustaining the Court's preFourteenth Amendment interpretations. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
could then rely on the Court's earlier pronouncements, even if in dicta, and could
reasonably believe that reprosecution by the federal government would not constitute
doublejeopardy. At the same time, however, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment,
according to Amar and Marcus, were eviscerating the premises of the dual sovereignty
concept as to everyone other than state officials. Under this scenario, Amar and Marcus
only need to explain why state officials should be treated differently, but do not need to
explain why state officials should lose a protection they previously would have enjoyed.
If, on the other hand, history is taken to mean that the Court was always wrong in its
dicta, Amar and Marcus have an additional obstacle to surmount. If the federal
government never should have been permitted to reprosecute a defendant previously
prosecuted by a state, what in the Fourteenth Amendment can possibly be read as freeing
the federal government itself from that constraint, even in a small category of cases?
Under usual principles of statutory construction, an ambiguous statute is interpreted as
maintaining the status quo, absent a clear showing that the legislature meant to change the
law. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (holding that omission of
mention of intent in criminal statute should not be construed as eliminating that element
from the crime as previously defined). The same canon should hold true in constitutional
interpretation. The Fourteenth Amendment is far from clear, and an incorrect Supreme
Court dictum is a particularly flimsy basis on which to base an inference that the framers
intended to endorse a dual sovereignty doctrine in some areas but not in others.
53. Any federal interest could be at stake: preventing insurrection, controlling
immigration policy, furthering foreign relations, preventing counterfeiting, governing
commerce. Under Amar and Marcus's proposal, the federal government could not
vindicate these interests through reprosecution (unless the defendant were a state officihl),
even though each interest has its own constitutional basis.
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simply because the equality provisions are located in the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. It is possible to imagine reasons why the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment might or might not have endorsed this result. Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment or its history tells us
whether they actually did.
Finally, I have previously suggested the possibility that federal
reprosecutions during the Reconstruction Era might be taken as some
evidence of intent to adopt a relitigation model. If the prevalent assumption before and after the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment was that
reprosecution was permissible, that might be taken as one piece of evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment shared that belief.
I have never found any evidence that reprosecution took place at all during the Reconstruction Era. In fact, some federal officials of the day are
said to have regarded the DoubleJeopardy Clause as a limitation on their
ability to reprosecute. 5 4
d. On Balance: Including the Defendant's Perspective. - My discussion
so far has centered on whether Amar and Marcus's position is consistent
and ineluctable. If they were to accept some of these criticisms, they
could be driven to broaden their exception, perhaps endorsing the federal/state dual sovereignty concept favored by Thurgood Marshall. 55 So
far, I have not presented any decisive argument for selecting the choice
of forum model over the relitigation model, but have criticized the manner in which Amar and Marcus reach their own choice. My most serious
criticism of Amar and Marcus's refined incorporation approach is that in
their refining process, they completely ignore the interests served by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. If there are two rival models of federalist process possible and the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel either,
the fact that the Bill of Rights defines reprosecution as inherently unfair
should make the choice easy.
It is not clear how Amar and Marcus's refined incorporation process
takes account of the values of Bill of Rights provisions that are at risk of
being refined away by the Fourteenth Amendment. A central tenet of
refined incorporation is that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates
the core of individual rights in the Bill of Rights and sloughs off inconsistent or outmoded structural protections. 56 The Double Jeopardy Clause,
once the Supreme Court's current dual sovereignty lens is discarded, is a
protection of individual rights. It protects individuals against the anxiety
and expense of a second trial, recognizing that prosecutorial practice
54. See Kaczorowski, supra note 45, at 29 (claiming that double jeopardy
considerations limited federal efforts at prosecution); Nieman, supra note 44, at 114
(stating that federal judges would have assumed that double jeopardy applied). Federal

officials regarded martial law as offering a welcome escape from such constitutional
constraints. See id. at 115.
55. See Heath v. Alabima, 474 U.S. 82, 98-101 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)

(arguing that dual sovereignty fiction is appropriate in federal-state but not state-state
contexts).
56. See Amar, supra note 12, at 1260-71.
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often makes perfect, and requires that the right to trial by jury be taken
seriously. Except in the Supreme Court's account, which Amar and Marcus properly reject, the Clause is not only, or even primarily, about the
attributes of sovereignty or limitations on sovereign powers.
If it is thus possible to sacrifice even part of the core of a Bill of
Rights provision because later amendments might be construed to prefer
a particular federalist structure, then other protections might also be endangered. For example, if we conclude that the majoritarian character of
juries was one of the principal obstacles to criminal convictions of Klan
members, 5 7 and perhaps in the Rodney King case as well, could we read
the Fourteenth Amendment as abolishing the right to trial by jury in
cases involving minority rights? If Koon and Powell's defense attorneys
misled the state court jurors and thereby jeopardized equality interests,
could we infer a small exception to the right to counsel?
Like the Supreme Court in Heath,5 8 Amar and Marcus present their
reasoning as structurally compelled and therefore impervious to balancing. But before we conclude that the combined goals of the Fourteenth
Amendment require us to pare down the Double Jeopardy Clause, we
should question the assumptions on which that conclusion is based as
rigorously as we question other decisions that put fundamental rights at
risk. Under standard constitutional analysis, courts consider whether a
fundamental individual right may be abrogated in the interest of a
greater good by asking whether infringement of that right is necessary
and narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate and compelling state interest.
The trimming of the Double Jeopardy Clause here is attributed to the
Constitution itself rather than to legislative or executive action. Any part
of the Constitution may, of course, be amended, and the constitutional
amendment will, by definition, be constitutional. If the Fourteenth
Amendment truly showed a clear intent to define double jeopardy as
Amar and Marcus propose, they would be right in saying that further
balancing would be inappropriate. However, we should demand a very
clear showing that a later amendment actually does abandon what otherwise would be viewed as an element of a minimally fair criminal proceeding. Giving the benefit of a presumption to the Double Jeopardy Clause
reintroduces the defendant's perspective, and also puts an appropriate
thumb on the scale in deciding between two otherwise equally plausible
implementations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Amar and Marcus cannot support their interpretation as a necessary
implication of the structure of the Fourteenth Amendment any more
than they can claim the support of a showing.of intent. I therefore characterize their "interpretation" as a choice that cannot be based on anything other than covert balancing of the "narrow" procedural rights of
the few and the equality rights of the many. Because they do not ac57. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
58. 474 U.S. 82 (1985). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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knowledge that they are balancing, they do not respond to my claim that
such balancing is inappropriate. What if Amar and Marcus were to accept my characterization of their argument? Could they then defend
their position by contending that their balance is correct?
One prominent constitutional scholar, Envin Chemerinsky, has argued to me that the retrial of Stacey Koon should have been permitted,
even without the excuse of the dual sovereignty doctrine, because this was
a case where the equality rights at stake should indeed take precedence
over the narrow procedural rights of the few.59 Why, Chemerinsky argues, should this Fifth Amendment protection not be subject to being
outweighed by a compelling countervailing interest when other constitutional guarantees, like the First Amendment's freedom of expression or
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of privacy, can be outweighed in
cases of great societal need? To this more candid balancing argument, I
have two responses. First, Bill of Rights provisions defining what constitutes a fair criminal proceeding may not be overridden even for the most
compelling reasons. I am more than happy to agree that the goals of the
Fourteenth Amendment, including the enforcement goals of Section
Five, are compelling. The same might be said, however, of the state's
interest in any criminal proceeding. The safety of the many could always
seem to outweigh the "narrow" procedural interests of the few, particularly the wicked few.60 The Bill of Rights does not invite us to balance the
rights required for a minimally fair criminal proceeding; it has already
drawn the appropriate balance. The Fourth Amendment's protections
are subject to balancing because that provision's key guarantee is that
individuals should not be subjected to "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. Under such a subjective standard, judicial balancing is inevitable and invited. The language of the First Amendment appears to be
more absolute, but has been interpreted by the court as allowing some
flexibility to prevent harm in cases of emergency. 6 1 The rules of criminal
procedure laid down in the Bill of Rights are more absolute in their language than the Fourth Amendment, and less susceptible to arguments
that their relinquishment is necessary to prevent harm. The only "harm"
we would prevent hy allowing a defendant's right to counsel or right to
trial by jury to be outweighed would be the harm of allowing a defendant
59. See also Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy Wars: The Case for a Civil Rights
"Exception," 41 UCLA L. Rev. 649 (1994).
60. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 22 ("On individual liberty grounds, ordinary
citizens will be worse off if any state can thwart federal criminal prosecution of that state's
abusive officials.").
61. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that
First Amendment does not protect " 'fighting' words-which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace."); RAV.v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct.
2538, 2547 (1992) (modem application of fighting words doctrine); see generally Michael
J. Mannheimer, Note, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1527 (1993)
(describing governmental power to prevent harm from fighting words as coextensive with
power to prevent harm caused by incitement" to imminent lawlessness).
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to escape punishment. The very point of the procedural guarantees is
that we must sometimes risk that harm in order to be fair. I cannot imagine the circumstances under which Chemerinsky would be willing to suspend the right to trial by jury or right to counsel because of an alleged
need to convict a particular defendant. The only reason that
Chemerinsky or the Supreme Court can take a different view of the right
not to be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense is that, as Justice
Black once predicted, 62 we have become inured to those violations by the
tenure of dual sovereignty doctrine.
Furthermore, even if it were appropriate to balance the double jeopardy interests against the equality interests at stake in civil rights prosecutions, relinquishing double jeopardy protection is not necessary to serve
the goals of equality. Allowing reprosecution of all state officials is certainly not a narrowly tailored response to the problem of self-dealing, or
the interests of equality generally. As I have already explained, I do not
agree with Amar and Marcus that successive prosecutions are necessary
because alternative means may be as effective in promoting equality with.out sacrificing a value protected in the Bill of Rights. Even if we were to
speculate that those alternatives might be somewhat less effective than
reprosecution, 63 it is arguable that, on balance, we should be willing to
tolerate some diminution in effectiveness in order to be fair. What is
more effective is not always what is necessary. 64
It is easy for Amar and Marcus to slight the interest in fairness because their poster child is Stacey Koon, a defendant whose videotaped
presumptive guilt soothes any discomfort we might otherwise feel in allowing his reprosecution. In his case, we know that the first jury erred
and that a wrongdoer would have escaped if not for the federal prosecution. If we imagine an innocent defendant, however, who is being
harassed by multiple prosecutions, double jeopardy values begin to seem
more attractive. Imagine one of the first black police officers, falsely
charged by Klan sympathizers with acts of misconduct. If a state court
jury was courageous enough to acquit, or a governor to pardon our presumptively innocent defendant in the face of a jury conviction, would
62. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 162-63 (Black, J., dissenting).
63. For such speculation, see Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 22-24.

64. Another question I have about refined incorporation is whether expanding the
time frame of constitutional interpretation to two points in time-the framing of the Bill of

Rights and of the Fourteenth Amendment-goes far enough. If we are to know, rather than
speculate, about how federal interests, or federalist structural concerns, would actually be
affected were reprosecution not allowed, why should we not also look at how our
interpretations would operate in the context of current developments in constitutional

law? Why determine whether reprosecution was necessary to promote equality interests in
1870 rather than whether it is necessary today? If the key to successful criminal convictions
of state official civil rights violators isjury selection, for example, see supra note 48, the fact
that the Supreme Court has recently imposed upon the states an increasingly intricate

system of bulwarks against unrepresentative juries seems relevant to deciding whether it is
still necessary to afford the federal government a second shot at convicting civil rights

violators.
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Amar and Marcus be so willing to allow a zealous federal official to prosecute again? Double jeopardy is a double-edged shield.
e. ForfeitingRights Seriously. - At one point, Amar and Marcus argue
that it may not be unfair to subject state officials to dual prosecution because state employees, as a function of their employment and access to
power, should not be deemed to share double jeopardy protection. 65
This argument is not even tempting. State employees are as likely as pri66
vate individuals to suffer anxiety and expense on being reprosecuted,
and, as the reprosecution of Stacey Koon shows, confront the same increased probability of conviction by prosecutors who have observed a
dress rehearsal. Is it fair to demand that state officials tolerate risks we
are unwilling to impose on others? In Garrity v. New Jersey,67 the Supreme
Court rejected the analogous argument that government employees may
be required to forfeit the protection of the privilege against self-incrimi68
nation as a condition of their employment.
Why do Amar and Marcus grasp at such a frail support? Their desire
to define away the problem of unfairness suggests that they do have a
lurking concern that, as they argued in rejecting the whole dual sovereignty package, reprosecution for the same offense is simply unfair.
II.

REFINING THE FINALITY OF JURY

VERDICrs

In the final section of their article, Amar and Marcus float a more
tentative proposal: to regard jury verdicts, even acquittals, as open to relitigation if the jury itself was not representative. The combined effect of
the proposals made or examined in their article would be to deprive defendants of some of their rights, 69 and to deprive juries of some of their
65. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 20-21.
66. The hypothetical state official who has colluded with other state actors in a
blatantly sham prosecution might avoid all anxiety and thus provide an occasional
exception. Some state employees will be provided with attorneys by the state, and thus
avoid some of the expense private actors would bear. I am nevertheless confident that
Stacey Koon, like Lemrick Nelson and Paul Hill, suffered some of the harms the Double
Jeopardy Clause alms to prevent (including the danger of being convicted although
innocent).
67. 385 U.S. 498 (1967).
68. Amar and Marcus suggest that they might be willing to forge a state official
exception to the privilege against self-incrimination as well. See Amar & Marcus, supra
note 6, at 27 n.143. This suggestion comes to fruition in a forthcoming article, Akhil Reed
Amar & Ren~e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination
Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming March 1995).
69. In Part I1, Amar and Marcus read the Double Jeopardy Clause's "same offense"
language more generously than the Court does in some respects, and more restrictively in
others, although they then rechannel some protection through the more amorphous Due
Process Clause. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 36. The differences between the
Court's definition and theirs are not great Here, I side with neither the Court nor Amar
and Marcus. LikeJustices Brennan and Souter, I would define "same offense" by focusing
on the defendant's conduct rather than the whims and vagaries of legislative definition.
See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2881 (1§93) (Souter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990) (Brennan, J.); Ashe v.

COLUMBIA LAW REV1EW

[Vol. 95:1090

power of finality. The finality of jury verdicts might be compromised in
two areas-certainly where state official defendants are tried for federal
civil rights violations, and possibly also where the jury is "unrepresentative." In arriving at these results, Amar and Marcus seek to blame everyone other than the jury. Their primary target is the defendant. If retrial
is necessary in the Rodney King case, it is Stacey Koon's fault for "inducing" a non-representative jury by moving for a change of venue.7 0 Once
again, casting blame on the defendant helps to alleviate any concern
about fairness.
However, blaming the defendant for inducing an unrepresentative
jury overstates the defense counsel's role in jury and venue selection.
The Supreme Court has theorized that jury selection is a form of state
action because it occurs under the aegis of the court. 71 The same may, of
course, be said for change of venue motions. Another branch of state
government, the legislature, controls venue rules as well as the mechanisms by which jury pools are created, the number of peremptory challenges allowed, and the extent of participation permitted defense counsel
on voir dire. The third branch, represented by the prosecutor, usually
has participation rights equal to the defense in selecting juries. Prosecutors make the original choice of venue and can then participate equally
in any argument about a possible change of venue.
The idea that a trial by non-representative jury is not really a trial, or
that a defendant has not really been in jeopardy if the jury was not representative, is not based on fault, but rather on a notion that the Supreme
Court has properly rejected in an analogous context. The Court has
steadfastly refused to allow an acquitted defendant to be retried in deference to the government's (or the people's) claimed right to one fair trial,
rejecting along the way the idea that whether the defendant has been
placed in jeopardy depends on what happens during the course of the
trial. 72 If the government does not have a countervailing right to a fair
trial of its own, why should the government's demand for one trial before
a representative jury be given greater weight? The government actually
has more control over jury selection and venue than it does over the fairSwenson, 397 U.S. 436, 449 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). I doubt that Stacey Koon
breathed a sigh of relief on learning that the federal statute at issue in his second trial
could be parsed into different elements.
70. See Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 52, 56.
71. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2354-57 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622-24 (1991).
72. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904) (holding that government
appeal from acquittal would be double jeopardy). In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969), the case that incorporated the double jeopardy guarantee, Benton was convicted
and had just lodged his appeal when the state's high court invalidated a provision of the
state constitution that required jurors to swear to their belief in God. The Supreme Court
upheld Benton's right not to be retried for a count on which he had been acquitted,
despite the fact that both the grand and petitjurors had operated under unconstitutional
procedures. See id. at 796.
For a host of other possible justifications, see Amar & Marcus, supra note 6, at 54-57.
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ness of a trial. Defendants can unilaterally disrupt or irifect a trial; they
cannot unilaterally select a jury or venue.
If we are rethinking double jeopardy law in light of the Rodney King
case, let us think more carefully about whether the lessons of that case
really warrant the radical reformation of criminal procedure that Amar
and Marcus entertain in their final section. If we blame the defendants
for the first jury's verdict, we are really blaming the adversary system. In
moving for a change of venue, in deconstructing the videotape for the
jury, the defendants and their counsel only availed themselves of the procedures the adversary system offers. 7 3 There was little in that first trial
that we can point to as evidence of self-dealing. The state prosecutor's
skill and judgment were widely debated, but few serious observers
thought that the prosecution was taking a dive, or overempathizing with
state employees. Amar and Marcus do suggest that the judge may have
been favoring fellow state officials in his ruling on the venue motion, 74
even if subconsciously. The ruling may have seemed tenable at the time,
however, as a response to the strength of the community reaction in Los
Angeles itself, the extraordinary pretrial publicity, and the need for a
venue that was close and convenient. Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight the judge would have changed his ruling, since it was this case that
taught us to give more serious consideration to how choice of venue is
likely to affect jury composition. 75 In any event, had Rodney King been
beaten in Simi Valley, procedural complaints about the change of venue
would be excised, but we would still be uncomfortable with the verdict.
If anyone got it wrong in the state trial, in most observers' accounts it
was the jury. In judging the rights of minorities, juries are unlikely to do
any better than the community they represent. If the state court jurors
identified with the defendants more than the victim, that may not be because they were nonrepresentative, but because they were representative
of the majority of people in the county, state, and country. Legislatures,
the other focal point of representative democracy, are not much more
zealous in responding to police brutality than that first jury. We cannot
judge the effectiveness of the federal legislative program I outlined above
because there has never been the political will in Congress to try it.76
73. If the grounds for changing venue in California pose a problem, the legislature
can change them, as observers of the trial have since proposed. See, e.g., Laurie L.
Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. Cal. L Rev. 1533,
1538-39, 1559 (1993); Note, Out of the Frying Pan or Into the Fire? Race and Choice of
Venue after Rodney King, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 708 (1993).
74. See supra note 24.
75. See Hoffman, supra note 59, at 681-86, for some incisive hindsight.
76. Consider the recent prosecutions of Paul Hill, see supra note 3, as one example of
how the law operates when it is the terrorists, rather than the victims, who are in the
minority. Hill attempted to terrorize those who wished to exercise a federally protected
rightjust as surely as the Ku Klux Klan terrorized freedmen. Congress responded quickly
with a statute that clearly applied to private individuals and provided far more substantial
penalties than the early civil rights laws did-life imprisonment as opposed to one year. See
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According to one classic account,7 7 the chief purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause is to preserve the jury's power to nullify the law. Amar
and Marcus suggest simply removing this power of finality in cases where
they suspect that juries are apt to abuse their nullification power. There
does indeed seem to be a pattern to the cases where juries abuse their
powers. The May Day stories we tell in praise ofjuries focus on triumphs
of popular will over corrupt or arbitrary government-like the nullifying
juries that acquitted John Peter Zenger and William Penn. 78 The horror
stories, the notorious failures of justice, usually involve minorities: the
Scottsboro case and its fictionalized counterpart, To Kill a Mockingbird,
Emmet Till, and now Rodney King.
Our most popular contemporary teller of stories, John Grisham,
seeks a happy synthesis of these disparate traditions in his bestselling
novel, A Time to Kill. The book begins as a thriller about jury selection
and gradually becomes a fairy tale about an all-white jury with the empathy to judge a black defendant as they would have judged a white defendant. In this fictional world, jurors become representative, not in the narrow sense of representing the views of their racial or ethnic groups, but in
the best sense of representative democracy, by putting aside bias and reasoning together.79 It no longer matters who is in the majority and who in
the minority.
Reexamining our norms of fair procedure will not bring about that
ideal world. The failures of the jury system are part of the system too.
When jurors err, sometimes the fault is not in the laws, but in ourselves.
CONCLUSION

As Akhil Amar continues his march through the Bill of Rights, sometimes alone and sometimes with cohorts, he challenges us to reexamine
even our most firmly rooted ideas about constitutional criminal procedure. Radical reconstruction always has its pros and cons. The penetrating gaze of a scholar who prefers principle to stare decisis can help to
expose the hollowness of constructs-like the dual sovereignty doctrinesupra note 84 and accompanying text. It was not until 1968 that Congress provided for a
life sentence if violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 resulted in death. See Act of Apr. 11, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 103(b), 82 Stat. 73, 75, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 92. And it was not until
1988 that Congress added the ten year penalty for violation of § 242 where bodily injury

results. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7019, 1988 U.S.C.CA.N.
(102 Stat.) 4181, 4396. In addition, the federal government was willing to prosecute Hill

first; both federal and state juries convicted quickly; the heaviest sentences were imposed.
Contrast the Koon case, in which the federal government did not prosecute first, in which
the federal penalty imposed was relatively slight, and in which the state jury acquitted.
77. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 13.
78. The cases mentioned here are all described in Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury:

The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy 68-73, 73-75 (1994), which also provides
bibliographical information on where to obtain fuller accounts.
79. See id. at 10-11 (arguing for a deliberative rather than a representative role for

jurors).
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based on assumptions that are no longer true, if indeed they ever were.
But the danger is that the sparkle of new proposals might distract us from
dusty old truths.
Constitutional criminal procedure is still largely dominated by the
interpretive constructs of the Warren Court which took personal liberty
and equality rights as categorical imperatives. Any radical reconstruction
of the Bill of Rights, starting from this point, is therefore likely to promote countervailing goals, such as federalism, crime control, and efficiency. Amar's general opposition to the dual sovereignty doctrine
shows, if evidence were necessary, that his own efforts at reconstruction
are not those of an ideologue determined to exalt those competing goals
at any cost. But his acceptance of dual prosecutions of state actors shows,
as if we needed any more proof, that the pull of those competing goals
can distort constitutional analysis if we do not keep our eyes firmly on the
values of the Bill of Rights itself.
Double Jeopardy law after Rodney King should be precisely what it
should have been before Rodney King. That case taught us that we still
have far to go in our quest for racial equality, but it gave us no reason to
start reconsidering what we long ago defined as necessary to make a criminal prosecution fair.

